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SUMMARY 
The Commodity Credit Corporation has been endeavoring to 
stabilize the supplies and prices of the staple crops by extensive 
storage operations. Two problems arise in connection with its 
program for corn - the tendency for stocks of coni to grow 
larger than necessary for stabilization purposes, and the tendency 
for the stocks to be heavily concentrated in certain producing 
areas. The questions this bulletin is intended to answer are: (1) 
What should be the outside limits of the size of the stabilization 
stocks of corn? (2) Where should the stocks be located; should 
they be concentrated in a few states, or spread over the -Corn Belt? 
SIZE OF STOCKS REQUIRED 
The 'chief purpose of the ever-normal granary program for corn 
is to stabilize market supplies by carrying over the excess above 
average production in years of good crops to add to supplies in 
years of short crops. An additional -purpose is to meet sudden 
changes in demand before changes in production can catch up with 
them. 
How large are ~he stocks of corn required for these purposes? 
Study of fluctuations in corn production in the past shows that 
the outside limit of the size of stocks required to stabilize corn 
supplies is about 700 to 800 million bushels. The quantity required 
to meet sudden changes in demand is about 200 to 300 million 
bushels. Total stabilization stocks of about 1 billion bushels, 
therefore, would be adequate for stabilization purposes. This is 
a much larger quantity than has been carried previously; but if 
fluctuations in market supplies are to be reduced, fluctuations in 
stocks must be greatly increased, and this calls for maximum 
stocks several times larger than the maximum stocks that were 
carried before government storage operations were undertaken. 
Since the CCC started storage operations in 1933, stocks have 
shown a tendency to exceed even the large size required for 
stabilization purposes. The stocks of cotton were several times 
larger than necessary from 1938 to 1942; the stocks of wheat were 
much too large in 1942; and the stocks of corn would have been 
too large in 1942 but for the wartime increase in the rate of feed-
ing to livestock and the increase in the use of corn for industrial 
alcohol. The loan rates have persistently been set too high, thus 
increasing production and cutting down consumption to the point 
where stocks have shown a tendency to become excessively large. 
One way to keep the loan rates for corn from being set too high 
would be to dissociate them from parity, and set them afresh each 
year at levels that would provide the hog-corn price ratio required 
to induce farmers to attain the hog production goals that year. 
Another less satisfactory but more automatic method would be to 
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reduce the loan rate by some such amount as 1 percent for every 
1 percent by which the stocks exceed 1 billion bushels. If the loan 
rate were announced each year shortly before corn planting time, 
for example about Jan. 15, it would affect corn production as well 
as consumption in the right direction. . 
LOCATION OF STOCKS 
The stabilization stocks have been concentrated heavily in the 
western Corn Belt states. It was thought at first that the 
geographiCally. flat loan rate was the chief cause of this concen-
tration, but the institution of location differentials in 1941 and 
1942 has reduced the concentration only to a small extent. 
Apparently, the surplus-producing character of the area is the 
chief determinant of the percentage of the crop that will be 
stored. I f this is true, storage stocks will continue to accumulate 
most in the western part of the Corn Belt. 
This, however, is fortunate, since the western Corn Belt states 
are subject to much more severe and long-lasting fluctuations in 
production than the eastern states. Stabilization stocks need to 
be larger (in terms of percentages of production in each state) 
in the western part of the Corn Belt than in the eastern part in 
order to meet the larger fluctuations in production that take place 
there. The small reduction in concentration resulting from the 
effect of location differentials in the loan rate has brought corn 
stocks in the different states to approximately the proper relative 
sizes needed for efficient operation. 
The Proper SiZ~ and Location of . 
Com Stabilization Stocks I 
By GEOFFREY SHEPHERD AND DAVID G. PATERSON 
The stabilization operations of the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion have become a major instrument for controlling the prices, 
the production and the flow of the great staple crops to market. 
They have brought an element of overall rationality into the 
marketing of these crops that was lacking in the !1nregulated open 
competitive market. They afford a means for stabilizing the 
market supplies and prices of farm products against fluctuations 
in production - a problem that has plagued producers and con-
sumers for many years. 
But in solving old problems they have created some new ones. 
One of these problems is the tendency for the stabilization stocks 
to grow larger than necessary for stabilization purposes. Another 
is the tendency for the stocks to be heavily concentrated in certain 
·producing areas. This bulletin deals with these two problems, 
with respect to corn. It attempts to answer these two questions: 
(1) What should be the outside limits of the size of the stabiliza-
tion stocks of corn? (2) Where should the stocks be located.; 
should they be concentrated in a few states, or spread over the 
Corn Belt? 
THE SIZE OF THE STABILIZATION STOCKS 
Corn production fluctuates more from year to year than the 
production of any other major crop in the United States. The 
chief reason for this is the variation in yields with good and bad 
weather. These variations cause severe fluctuations in corn prices, 
and in hog production and prices also. This increases the costs of 
producing, processing and distributing these products, and causes 
production to average less over a period of years than if the 
fluctuations in corn production could be leveled out. 
lt is impossible to smooth out production, but the flow of corn 
to market can be smoothed out by storage operations designed 
to withhold the excess over average production in good crop years 
and release it in .short crop years. That has been the chief pur-
pose of the storage operations conducted by the Commodity 
Credit Corporation since 1933 - to smooth out variations in 
physical supplies. 
1 Project 722 of the Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station. 
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Fig. 1. Corn acreage, yield per acre, and production in the. United States, 
1900 to 1942. 
I f demand remained constant, this would stabilize prices. But 
demand fluctuates also, and a secondary objective of stabilization 
operations has been to meet these variations in demand as well as 
in supply. . 
How large are the stocks required to attain these two objectives? 
This question is considered in the next two sections. 
STABILIZING MARKET SUPPLIES AND' PRICES 
AGAINST FLUCTUATIONS IN PRODUCTION 
The original objective of the ever-normal granary program was 
to smooth out variations in physical supplies - to withhold the 
excess over average supplies in years of large crops and release 
it in years of short crops. The size of the stocks required for this 
type of stabilization operation can be determined on an objective 
statistical basis. 
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Figure 1 shows that the long-time average yield of corn in the 
United States has' been about 26 bushels to the acre. The trend 
of yields has remained horizontal2 • The size of the stocks that 
would have been necessary for complete stabilizaiton of supplies 
in the past can be calculated by mUltiplying the excess over the 
average yield of 26 bushels to the acre by the acreage planted, 
each year in succession, to see how large the stabilization stocks 
would grow before they would be drawn down in years of short 
crops. 
This procedure shows that from 1860 to 1900, the stocks 
required for complete stabilization of supplies by storing the 
excess over average production in good crop years would at no 
time have grown larger than a billion bushels. During the decade 
from 1900 to 1910, however, seven large crops occurred in 
succession, and the stabilization stocks would have increased to 
about 2 billion bushels. In the 1920's they would have grown 
larger yet, to nearly 3 billion bushels. Yet they still would not 
have been large enough to fill in the gap caused by the succession 
6f four short crops from 1933 to 1936 inclusive. 
In view of these facts, the conclusion was reached in an earlier 
study3 that complete stabilization of the market supplies of corn 
should not be attempted. Drouths as severe as those from 1933 
to 1936 have occurred only once in 75 years, and it would clearly 
not be sensible to carry large stocks of corn for perhaps 50 years 
or more iri order to cope with drouths of such severity. If the 
years 1934-36 are excluded, stocks of a billion bushels would have 
been large enough to stabilize supplies. 
But yields are likely to vary less in the future than they have 
in the past. The yields from the hybrid corn now used so 
.extensively apparently fluctuate less, proportionally, than the 
. yields from the open~pollinated varieties previously used. When 
drouths come in the future, corn yields will not be reduced so 
much, proportionally, as they were in the past. In addition, 
acreage control upwards as well as downwards may be used to 
reduce the size of the stabilization stocks required. For these 
reasons it was concluded that the outside limit of the size of 
stocks required for stabilizing the physical supplies of corn in the 
future should be set at about 700 or 800 million bushels. 
This would stabilize only the supplies of corn. The production 
of the other feeds (principally oats and barley) fluctuates some-
what less than the production of corn, but oats and barley are 
produced in much the same general area as corn, and there is 
2 The yield will probably average higher than 26 bushels in the future, for 
hybrid seed corn is being used more and more widely, and it out yields the ordmary 
open'pollinated varieties by about 15 percent in the heart of the Com Belt. 
a Controlling corn and hog supplies and prices, Technical Bulletin No, 826, 
June, 1942, U. S. Department of Agriculture, hy the senior author of the present 
bulletin. ' 
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some correlation (+0.5) between fluctuations in the U. S. average 
yields of corn and oats. These variations in the yields of the 
different crops reinforce each other rather than offset each other. 
The total production of corn, oats and barley together (with the 
different grains weighted according to their relative feeding values 
per bushel) fluctuates less, proportionally, than the production 
of corn alone, but more absolutely (in terms of bushels). The 
same thing is true of their weighted average yields. 
The storage program for corn has been in effect since 1933, 
and a program for barley was initiated in May, 1940. A program 
for oats would round out the picture, and complete coverage would 
then be provided for all of the major feeds. So far, however, no 
program for oats has been put into effect. The chief reason for 
this may be that it would cost more to store oats than corn. A 
bushel of oats occupies the same space as a bushel of corn, but 
has only half the feediNg value, so oats require twice as much 
storage space per unit of feeding value as shelled corn. Ear corn 
takes nearly twice as much space per bushel as shelled corn (there-
fore taking nearly as much space as oats), but a crib costs less to 
build and maintain than a bin. Corn and oats can be substituted 
as feeds without much difficulty over a fairly wide range, so the 
lower cost of storing corn has been considered sufficient reason 
for not embarking on a storage program for oats. 
A storage program for oats would require carrying storage 
stocks up to about 250 or 300 million bushels in size. I f no 
storage program for oats is undertaken, about 100 million bushels 
more corn should. be added to the corn stocks in order to carry 
the load of fluctuations in oats production in addition to corn 
production .. (This figure, 100 million bushels of corn, is a little 
less than half the 250 to 300 million bushels of oats that would 
be required for stabilization, because a bushel of oats has about 
half the feeding value of a bushel of corn, and because the corre-
lation between the fluctuations in the production of the two crops 
is not very high.) The estimate of 700-800 million bushels of 
corn given earlier would in that case be raised to 800-900 million 
bushels. 
THE EFFECT OF USING SOME WHEAT FOR FEED 
Future policies with respect to wheat may bring a new element 
into the picture. Ordinarily, some of the wheat crop is fed to 
livestock. From 1922 to 1926 the quantity fed was, on the average, 
about 50 million bushels a year. For the crops of 1936 to 1941, 
the average was about 100 million bushels a year. The feeding 
of wheat from the 1942 crop is being subsidized by the CCC; 125 
million bushels was sold by the CCC for feeding purposes at 
prices equivalent to 85 percent of corn parity, and 150 million 
more at 100 percent of corn parity. Together with the wheat 
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that is being fed without subsidies, about one-third of the 1942 
wheat crop is likely to be fed to livestock. The percentage of the 
1943 crop fed may be equally high. 
After the great expansion in the wartime demand for meat 
and therefore for livestock feed has passed, the percentage of the 
wheat crop fed' will no doubt decline from its ~urrent levels, but 
the upward trend evident before the war is likely to continue,; 
Since 1900 the price of wheat has been steadily declining relative 
to the price of corn. Reductions in the cost of producing wheat 
have apparently been greater than the reductions in the' cost of 
producing corn, until some observers believe that wheat in the 
heavy wheat-producing areas can be .produced now at as Iowa egst 
as corn in the Corn Belt. If this is true, a large proportion of 
the wheat crop will be fed. If, on the other hand, the price of 
wheat continues to be supported by means of CCC loans at arti-
ficially high levels relative to corn, and the AAA continues t91Je 
unable to reduce wheat production, wheat stocks will continue 
to increase in size and wheat feeding will continue to be sub-
sidized in order to keep the wheat stocks from increasing to 
unmanageable proportions. Either way, it seems that an' in-
creasingly large proportion of the wheat crop will be fed to 
livestock. 
In that case, the stocks of wheat can be drawn upon, as well a~ 
the stocks of corn, when cotn supplies are short. The ever-
normal granary for corn, ,could contain some wheat as well as 
corn. Does this mean that less corn needs to be carried than the 
700 to 800 million bushels arrived at above· on the basis of corn 
alone? 
The answer depends mainly upon whether fluctuations in 
wheat production coin,=ide with fluctuations in corn production; 
I f whenever short corn -crops depleted the stabilization stocks ,of 
corn, short wheat crops depleted the stabilization stocks of wheat 
also, wheat stocks could not be relied upon as part of the stabiliza-
tion stocks of feed, along with corn. But if there is no positive 
correlation b~tween variations in the -size.,ofthe 'two-crops, wheat 
stocks can be used, except only in the Cases where small crops of 
corn and wheat happen to coincide, either by -accident or because 
of an unusually widespread drouth or other weather catastrophe. 
Examination shows that the correlation between the variations 
in the yields of corn and wheat is zero, except only for the positive 
correlation resulting from the extremely severe drouths' of 1934 
and 1936 _ and the extre~ely good weather of 1942. Figure 2 
shows that if those 3 years are ignored, the correlation betweel'i 
the, ~verage y.ieId of corn in the pnited States and wheat yields 
(both the sprmg wh~a~ and the wmter wh~at) is, for all practical 
purposes, zero. , ThIS IS true of wheat yields per acre harvested 
as ,well as per acre seeded. 
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This does not, however, point to the simple answel' that wheat 
stocks can be counted as part of the stabilization stocks of corn. 
The two crops are produced, in the main, in -different areas, and 
the shipping charges from the wheat areas to the corn feeding 
areas would average perhaps between 10 and 20 cents per bushel 
and range up to considerably higher figures. In the areas where 
wheat and corn are produced in large quantities, such as Kansas, 
the variations in the sizes of the two crops correspond closely. 
The closer the corn and wheat areas lie to each' other, and the 
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lower the. shipping costs between them, the more closely do 
variations·.in production coincide. And when the need for large 
reserves of feed is greatest - when very severe drouths occur 
on a national scale, as in 1934 ~nd 1936 - the total production 
of wheat reaches its lowest levels along with a low production. of 
corn. In view of these considerations, it appears that the use of 
an increasingly large percentage of the wheat crop for livestock 
feed will not appreciably reduce the size of the stocks of corn 
needed to stabilize corn supplies. It may reduce the size of the 
stocks of corn needed to meet changes in demand. That subject 
is considered in the next section. 
STABILIZING PRICES AGAINST FLUCTUATIONS IN DEMAND 
I f the demand for corn remained constant, stabilizing the 
physical supplies would stabilize prices also. But the demand 
for corn fluctuates violently; the same size crop· that sold for 85 
cents a bushel in 1927-28 sold for 32 cents a bushel in 1931-32. 
The difference between the two prices was entirely the result of 
differences in the strength of the demand. 
Accordingly, storage operations have been used to stabilize 
p~ices against fluctuations in demand as well as in supply. The 
Federal Farm Board, set up in June, 1929, conceived that "stabil-
ization means keeping prices from going unduly low in periods 
of large supplies or poor demand . . . and unduly high during 
periods of short supplies or of inflation.'" The Farm Board went 
on the rocks attempting to effect this sort of stabilization -
trying to hold prices up not only when crops were large but also 
when -the demand began its long decline. in 1929. . The eee, set 
up to replace the Farm Board in 1933, tried to do the same thing. 
It continued to hold prices up even after the demand had re-
covered, and by 1940 had accumulated considerably larger stocks of 
cotton and wheat than were necessary for stabilization purposes. 
Then carne the war in 1941. The great increase in demand that 
carne with it converted the large stocks from a burden into a major 
military asset, a "war chest" of food and fiber. The policy of 
stabilizing prices against fluctuations in demand had wrecked the 
Federal Farm Board in 1933 and brought the ece close to major 
difficulties in 1940, but the usefulness of the large stocks during 
the present war has revived the idea that prices should be stabilized 
against fluctuations in demand as well as in supply. This sort of 
stabilization would not only reduce fluctuations in prices but 
would also build up a "war chest" of reserve supplies that could 
be used in times of great emergency. 
But a storage policy of this sort would not be a good way to 
deal .with changes in demand, for several reasons. The length 
4 Third annual report, Federal Farm Board, 1032. 
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of time intervening between the bottom of a depression and· the 
top of a boom is so great, and so uncertain in length,. that physical 
deterioration and the cost of storing corn for so long a time would 
become excessive. The cost of storing corn from 1932 to 1942, 
at Scents per year, would be 50 cents per bushel. If the stocks 
are regarded not as stabilizers from depressions to boom periods, 
but as a war chest, the costs would be ,higher yet; it would have 
been a considerable burden after World War I to have carried 
substantial storage stocks. of this character as a reserve against the 
needs of the next war. . 
Storage operations would mean that during depressions the 
Federal Government would be withholding large stocks from 
consumption, ata time when many low-income consumers would 
not have enough to eat. It would increase the paradox of starva-
tion in the midst of plenty. This sort of thing is bad enough when 
it is done by private industrial manufacturirig corporations; it 
would be difficult to defend if it were under,taken on a large scale 
by the Federal Government. . - . 
Several other .steps should be taken before storage operations 
are resorted to. The best way to meet changes in demand is first 
of all to do everything possible to keep them from happening -
to stabilize industrial activity in order to keep demand stable. in 
the first place. This calls for stabilizing industrial activity by 
means' of appropriate governmental fiscal policy, by large scale 
public works projects, social security programs and all the other 
measures that can maintain demand at a high level. 
It is too much to hope that these activities will be completely 
successful in stabilizing industrial activity. Some degree of 
depression may materialize in spite of all that is done along 
these lines. An additional weapon should at least be prepared, 
ready to go into action if needed - an extensive nutritional 
program, such as the Food Stamp Plan, for unemployed and low 
income groups. In time of depression, these groups do not have 
enough purchasing power to buy an adequate and balanced diet. 
They begin to suffer nutritional deficiencies at the same time that 
farms begin to suffer from low farm prices. Both result from the 
same cause, and both can be remedied or at least alleviated by 
extensive programs designed to provide low-income consumers 
with an adequate ration at reduced prices or free. This calls 
for large scale government subsidy of consumption among low 
income groups. The bulk of the corn crop is used for livestock 
feed, so a subsidy to the consumption of livestock products would 
support the price of corn. 
COMPROMISE SOLUTION 
If this is not sufficient to stabilize prices, farmers will press for 
commodity loans at relatively high rates, in order to hold prices 
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up directly. The objection to this is that it would tie up quantities 
,of products in storage, as mentioned above. The outcome will 
probably be a compromise between farmers' demands for prices 
to be supported and consumers' demands that they be permitted 
to decline. The best way to support prices moderately would be 
to use a moderately high loan, high enough to give some relief to 
farmers but low enough to induce them (along with other means 
such as AAA activities) to reduce production moderately. Re-
ducing production would be better than building up very large 
stocks, for the costs of storage for 5 or 10 years would be burden-
some, and it would be better to reduce production for a few years 
by methods which would store up fertility in the soil and permit 
a rapid expansion of production later on when demand increased 
again. The AAA was not able to reduce production as a long-
time proposition from 1933 to 1940, at a time when prices were 
rising. But it should be able to do it as a short time measure, 
when prices ar:e moderately declining. It is easier to change 
production in line with changes in demand than against them. 
There is an inherent time lag in the response of production 
to changes in demand, so the lower loan rate should be based upon 
the most accurate forecasts possible and announced in advance, 
shortly before the time for planting corn and other crops.. This 
forecasting can never be perfect, and small stocks could well be 
carried to correct errors in estimates and to fill in the brief space 
of time before production can change enough to match changes 
in demand. These stocks do not need to be very large. Two or 
three hundred million bushels of corn would probably be enough 
for this purpose. This quantity, added to the 700 or 800 million 
required for. stabilizing market supplies against fluctuations in 
production, would total about 1,000 million bushels of corn. 
An outside limit of a billion bushels of corn, therefore, would 
seem to be large enough for all stabilization purposes. 
This is a large quantity, much larger than the quantities that 
have been carried in the past. The largest total stocks of corn 
ever held in the United States on Oct. 1 were the 1940 stocks 
of 700 million bushels. But only 20 percent of that quantity 
(140 million bushels) was owned by the CCC, and less than half 
of it (320 million bushels) was under loan; the rest (240 million 
bushels) was held by farmers and other private owners. Farmers 
and other private owners continued to hold about as much corn, 
free of CCC loans, as they did before the CCC was created. The 
CCC holdings of corn, plus the quantities under loan, did not 
displace any private holdings; they were simply additions to the 
private holdings. ' 
A two-fold conclusion, then, emerges: (1) The nation should 
prepare to carry stocks of corn up to 1 billion bushels in size as 
part of the program for more rational over-all control of corn 
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prices, production and consumption than was 'exercised by private 
traders through the open competitive market system of earlier 
years. (2) Only a part of these stocks need to be held by the 
government stabilization corporation. ' A major part pf the stocks 
will be held in private hands, not under Gee· ownership: or loan. 
THE LEVEL OF LOAN RATES 
Adequate safeguards should be set up to keep stocks, from 
accumulating to a larger size than necessary' for' stabilization 
purposes. There is" a tendency for loan rates to be set'too high, 
which 'caused the stocks of cotton to accumulate td ';j, size several 
times larger than necessary from 1938 to 1942. It also caused 
the stocks of wheat to" be much too large in 1942, and would have 
had a similar effect on the stocks of corn but for the great war-
time increase in the rate of feeding to livestock and in use by 
the industrial alcohol industry. , 
This tendency derives support from the emphasis on 1909-14 
parity prices, which are out of line with economic realities, 'because 
,the cost of producing corn has been reduced materially by the use 
of hybrid seed, mechanization and other changes in cultural 
practices. The loan rates should be dissociated from parity and 
based instead upon two things: One is the ratio with' livestock 
prices that will induce the production of the quantities of livestock 
needed. ,The other is the level' of corn prices required to induce 
the necessary production of corn. This is the procedure that is 
being follow~d at the present time, its adoption being made 
relatively easy by the strength of the demat1d~ which makes for 
high prices. " 
The loan rate thus determined should be announced' shortly 
before corn planting time, say Jan. 15 after the Jan. 1 stocks of 
corn 'are known. This would give farmers time to make up their 
minds as to how many acres of corn they would 'plant in response 
to that loan rate. If the yields on that acreage turned out to be 
higher than average, most of the excess over average 'would be put 
under the loan or withheld by farmers without loans. I f the yields 
turned 'out to be lower thap. average, the storage stocks that had 
previously been built up would be drawn down. In either case 
the supplies available for consumption would be equal to the 
acreage planted multiplied by the average' yield (the yield that 
would have resulted if the weather had be,en average). 
If the demand declines substantially after the war, it may not 
be so easy to adhere to this pro~edure. I f so, the tendency for 
loan rates to be set too high could be corrected by providing by 
law that whenever the size of the stabilization stocks of corn 
exceeded a billion bushels, the loan rat,e should automatically be 
reduced by 1 percent for every 1 percent ~y which the stocks of 
old corn Oct. 1 were greater than 1 billion bushels. A provision 
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of this sort was included:in the Agricultural Administration Act 
of 1938, but the loan rate was tied .to the size of the crop, exclusive 
of the car.ry-over, whereas it should be tied to the carry-over, 
exclusiv:e of the size of the crop. If this loan rate were announced 
each year just before corn planting time, it would affect production 
as well as consumption in the right direction. . 
THE LOCATION OF STABILIZATION STOCKS 
The second problem considered in this bulletin is the proper 
location of the stabilization stocks of corn. . 
The problem of the 'proper location of the stabilization stocks 
of corn was not given mu~h attention until 1940. By that time 
the heavy concentration of storage stocks of corn in Iowa, Illinois 
and Minnesota brought the problem to public attention. These 
are the heaviest corn-producing states in the Union, aO(~ their . 
stocks would be expected to be larger than those of other states , 
wh~re less corn is produced. But Iowa's stocks· were twice as ." 
large, in proportion to her production, as the stocks for the, 
United States were in proportion to United States production. 
Minnesota's were 50 percent larger tlian proportional. Illino~' 
were approximately proportional to her production. Corn. was 
going into storage instead of into. hogs, perhaps to the detriment 
of the best interests.of these states from a livestock feeding point 
of view. . .. 
Three questions ~ere raised. Why had the stoc~s accumulated 
so heavily in those states? Should they continue to be concen-
trated thus? If not, how should they be. dispersed in the future? 
THE FLAT LOAN RATE 
From 1933, when the first loans on corn were made, to 1938, 
the loan rate had been uniform over the country. In the Agricul-
tural Administration Act of 1938, an area called the "commercial 
corn area" was outlined, including all counties in which the average 
production of corn was 450 bushels or more per farm· and 4 
. bus4els or more for each acre of farm land in the county.6 This 
area included most of the Corn Belt, and about 99 percent of the· 
loans were made in the area. The loan rate outside this area 
was 75 percent of the rate within the area. But the rates in both 
cases, in the area and outside of it, were geographically uniform 
or flat. 
Normally the price of corn.is lower in the heavy surplus 
producing states such as Iowa and Illinois than in the eastern 
Corn Belt states (the Iowa farm price averages 9. or 16 cents 
lower than the Ohio price), and the c~nc1usion seemed reasonable 
G The Agricultural AdminIstration Act of 1938, Sec. 301 (4) (A). 
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that this was the explanation for the concentration of corn stocks 
in the low-price surplus-producing areas. The flat loan rate was 
higher relative to the open market price in those areas, and, 
offering a more attractive outlet than the open market, caused 
corn to accumulate more heavily there.s 
Accordingly, it seemed that the way to overcome this concen-
tration of stocks was to institute location differentials in the loan 
rate for corn to bring the rates more nearly in line with the prices. 
The loan rate for cotton had originally been geographically flat, 
but in 1938, because of the accumulation of cotton in the low price 
areas, location differentials were instituted,. based on shipping 
charges to the heavy consuming or export areas. Location 
differentials were similarly used with wheat from the time of the 
first loan in 1938. The need for location differentials for corn 
loan rates appeared to be evident, the precedent had already been 
established with cotton and wheat, and the only question was: 
What should the differentials be based on in the case of corn? 
Should they be based on freight rates, and if so, on corn, or hogs 
or other products? Or should they be based on average corn 
prices by counties or other smaII areas, over a recent period of 
years, and if so, what years? 
After much discussion, differentials were finally instituted 
for the 1941 corn crop, based on average farm prices by crop 
reporting districts (the smallest areas for which data existed) 
over the previous 16 years, adjusted to 20 year state averages 
and broken down by counties. The range from the lowest to 
the highest rate in the commercial corn area was 14 cents; but in 
order not to make too severe a break with the previous flat rate, 
the range was arbitrarily reduced to 10 cents by flattening off at 
the top and bottom. .. 
The differentials for the 1942. crop were. based on simple 
averages of the monthly prices for (1) the 20-year period July, 
1922, through June, 1942, and (2) the 5-year· period June, 1937, 
through June, 1942, excluding in each case the months falling 
within the crop years 1934-35 and 1936-37. The simple average 
of these two period-averages was used, thus giving more weight 
to the recent years. The 10 cent limitation imposed upon the' 
differentials in 1941 was removed. The differentials are shown 
by states in table 1. The differential in each case is to be added 
to or subtracted from the average loan rate for corn for. the 
United States as a whole (85 percent of United States farm price 
parity in the case of the 1942 crop). 
6 L. J. Norton. Effect. of the uniformity of corn loans, regardless of location. 
Ill. Farm Econ., No. 67, p. 437·439. 
T. W. Schultz and O. H. Brownlee. Our U. S. Iowa Cllrn granary an4 how it 
has affected hogs in the Corn Belt. Iowa Farm Econ., 7 (1): 8-10, 16 illus. 
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TABLE 1: LOAN RATE DIFFERENTIALS FOR THE 1942 CORN CROP. 
(Cents per bushel.) 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
Ohio 
South nakotl\ 
Wisconsin 
minus 
minus 
minus 
minus 
plus 
minus 
plus 
minus 
plus 
minus 
plus 
4.0' 
2.6 
7.7 
1.6 
4.2 
10.9 
1.0 
6.1 
1.5 
11.2 
2.2 
These differentials represent only the average differentials in 
prices. The actual differentials in prices vary widely from year 
to year, and even from month to month. From 1921 to 1940, the 
range in the monthly fluctuations in the Iowa-Ohio differential 
was 42 cents. The chief reason for the annual fluctuations is the 
changes that take place from year to year in relative sizes of the 
corn crop in the different states. 
There is a question whether the loan rate differentials should 
vary from year to year to some extent in line with variations 
in the relative sizes of the crop in the different states. On the 
whole, it appears desirable not to do this. A stable loan rate 
structure from year to year reduces to a minimum the shipping 
of corn from one area to another one year and perhaps back again 
the next year, as crop sizes vary from year to year. Occasional 
local surpluses go into storage for a year or so, instead of being 
shipped out each year. 
In the case of price ceilings, however, a stable differential 
structure would not work. Local shortages could not be made 
up by increased inshipments if the fixed differentials based on 
average prices were not high enough to cover transportation costs. 
It would seem to be necessary to provide for variations from 
year to year in the differentials for price ceilings. 
EFFECTS OF LOCATION DIFFERENTIALS 
It was expected that the location differentials instituted after 
1940 would rectify at least most of the tendency for corn stocks 
to be concentrated most heavily in the low-price surplus-producing 
states. But as the 1941-42 season progressed, and corn loans were 
made, week by week the figures told an interesting story: Corn 
was going under the loan in about the same percentages in each 
state as during the year before. By the end of the crop year 
the percentages of the 1941 corn crop put under loan in each 
state during 1941-42 were not greatly different from the per-
centages of the 1940 crop put under loan during 1940-41. Table 
2 and fig. 3 show that the concentration of loans in the western 
part qf Jhe Corn Belt was almost as great under differential loan 
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Fig. 3. Quantity ot cOrn put under loan as a percentage of corn production in 
each state (A) under the flat loan rate in 1940·41, and (B) under differential loan 
rates in 1941·42. 
rates in 1941-42 as it had been under the flat loan rate in 1940-41.7 
Why was this? Why did not the differential loan rates ,reduce 
the concentration of corn loans in the low-price surplus-producing 
areas? 
Analysis of the data by states shows that equal relations between 
the loan rate and the farm price do not cause equal percentages 
of the corn crop to be put under loan in the different states.8 Corn 
7 The data for the 1942 crop will not all be in until the 1942 loan season closes 
on Sept. 30, 1943. The data for the loans made up to date (May 15, 1943) show 
much the same concentration of loans in the western part of the Corn Belt as in 
the case ot the 1940 and 1941 crops. The 1942 percentages for each atate may be 
made comparable with the 1940 data by dividing them through by a single figure 
(0.38) to bring the percentage of the 1942 crop that was put under loan for the 
nine states as a whole up to the 'same percentage as that of the 1940 crop that was 
put under .Ioan. (The 1941 data were left in their original form, since the con· 
version fignre in their case would be practically 1.0.) The percentages for 1942 
thus computed are; 
Nebraska .•• • . . • . . . . . •• 10.8 
Iowa •••...•.••••....•• 13.6 
South Dakota .•....•.... 4.5 
Minnesota .. . • • . . . . . . • • 1.6 
Illinois •.•......•...... 0.5 
Missouri .....•.•••..••• 
Kansas ............... . 
Indiana ...........•.••• 
Ohio •.........•••.•.•• 
2.4 
2.4 
0.8 
0.3 
The 1942 percentages for the three states in the southwest (Nebraska, Iowa, 
and Kansas) average about as high in 1940. The two states in the northwest 
(South Dakota and Minnesota) run much lower; so doea the central state, Illinois. 
The south central and eastern states (Missouri, Indiana and Ohio) run the S8me 
as in 1940 or slightly higher. There is more variation from the 1940 data by 
states in this case than in the case of the 1941 loans, but only B slight general 
reduction, it any, in the concentration of loans in the west. 
8 David G. Paterson. The size and location of stabilhation stocks of corn. 
Unpnhlished thesi.. Library, Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, 1942. 
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TABLE 2. QUANTITIES OF CORN· SEALED AS PERCENTAGES OF PRO· 
DUCTION IN EACH STATE IN 1940·1941 AND 1941·1942. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Quan Ii ty. of Corn sealed as 
corn sealed Production a percentage 
1,000 bushels 1,000 bushels of production 
I (1) (2) 
I -XI00 -XI00 (3) (4) (1940) 
\ 
(1941) (1940) (1941) (1940) (1941) 
Nebraska 13,205 I 17.707 105,587 157,638 12.51 11.23 
Iowa 59,380 47,725 473,760 464,814 12.53 10.27 
South Dakota 4,053 3,465 50,166 50,006 8.08 6.93 
Minnesota 8,035 8,188 172,457 196,245 4.66 4.17 
Illinois 13,590 28,228 328,735 401,362 4.13 7.03 
Missouri 2,972 1,987 124,044 133,216 2.40 1.76 
Kansas 633 1,041 42,352 57,224 1.49 1.82 
Indiana 921 1,711 145,558 177,030 .63 .97 
Ohio 260 592 122,360 160,974 .21 .37 
-- -- -- --
Totals 103,049 110,644 1,565,019 1,778,509 6.58 6.22 
I I 
Source: Loan data from letter of Feb. 3, 1943, from Mr. 'William McArthur, 
Director, Grain Division, CCC, to Geoffrey Shepherd. . 
starts going under loan in Iowa, Nebraska and Kansas even when 
the spread between the loan rate and the farm price is negative 
(the loan rate is below the price) by as much as 7 to 10 cents. 
In. other states the spread has to be within 2 or 3 cents of zero 
before corn begins to go under the loan. In all cases, as the spread 
increases positively the percentage of the crop put under loan 
increases, but at different rates in the different states. An increase 
in the spread of 5 cents is associated with an increase of 5 percent 
in the amount of corn put under the loan in Iowa, but only 1,4 
of 1 percent in Ohio. . 
This means that even if the loan rates in each county were 
identical with the average prices in each state, or uniformly above 
or below them, different percentages of the crop would move 
into storage in the different states. 
The differences in the percentages of the corn crop put under 
loan in the different states appear to depend chiefly upon the 
extent of the surplus production of corn in the states, not upon 
relative loan rates. In general, the greater the surplus production 
of corn in the state, the higher is the percentage of the crop put 
under loan. If most of the corn in a state is fed up locally each 
year, as in Ohio, very little corn will be put under loan even though 
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the loan rate is considerably higher than the price; nearly all of 
it will need to be fed, so why put it under loan only to take it out 
again in a few months? But if a good deal of the corn is going 
to be sold as cash corn anyway, as in Iowa, farmers are more 
likely to put it under loan, where they can eventually "sell it to 
the government" if they wish. Evidently, corn goes under the 
loan in large percentages of production in the low-price surplus-
producing areas, not so much because of the low price as because 
of the surplus production. 
The CCC non-recourse loans on corn have been most attractive 
to the farmers who normally sell some corn as cash grain. Corn 
that normally would be sold anyway can be placed under govern-
ment loan without requiring any change in the farming systems. 
The only requirement has been the need for additional storage 
space. This has been partly taken care of, since the corn-resealing 
programs have provided for storage payments to borrowers, which 
have encouraged many farmers to build additional cribs. 
But farmers who normally feed to livestock all the corn they 
raise can not seal much of their corn without altering their 
farming enterprise. A change in their enterprise may leave some· 
buildings and equipment idle or may under-utilize labor. This 
appears to be the reason for the small amounts of corn sealed in 
the eastern Corn Belt even under differential loan rates. 
Apparently, the smaller the size of the area considered, the 
more important is the influence of the amount of surplus corn 
available. In the state of Iowa, for example, the range in the 
1941 loan rate from the lowest county rate to the highest was 6 
cents (the range in the 1942 loan rates is 6 cents also). These 
di·fferences in loan rates approximately reflect the normal differ-
ences in prices in the different counties of Iowa. But the per-
centages of the crop actually put under loan in the different 
counties ranged from zero to 27 percent, both in 1941 when there 
was a range of 6 cents in the loan rates within the state, and in 
1940 when the loan rate was flat. The small extent to which the 
introduction of location differentials in 1941 affected the per-
centage of the crop put under loan is shown by counties in fig. 4. 
The relation between the percentages stored in the 2 years is 
close to 1 to 1 throughout. 
All this means that even with location differentials fully reflect-
ing differences in average prices by counties and states, as they 
do now,9 corn will still continue to accumulate in storage in much 
higher percentages of production in the surplus-producing areas 
than in the self-sufficient or deficit areas. 
9 The arbitrary limitation of the range in county rates to 10 cents in 1941 waS 
removed in 1942, the range now being 16 cents in the main commercial corn area, 
extending 8 cents higher for a few counties in Maryland and southeastern 
Pennsylvania. 
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SHOULD THE STABILIZATION STGlCKS CONTINUE 
TO BE CONCENTRATED? 
Is it desirable to have storage stocks continue to accumulate 
most heavily in the surplus-producing areas - not quite so 
heavily as under the geographically flat loan rate, but stiH in 
much larger percentages of production than in the other areas? 
Figure 5 shows that fluctuations in corn production from year to 
year are greater in the western and southern Corn Belt states than 
in the central, eastern, and northern Corn Belt states. They also 
last longer. In South Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas, and to a 
lesser extent in Missouri, the 1934 and 1936 drouths reduced 
corn production to about 10 percent of its previous levels. 
Production was not only severely reduced; it stayed severely 
reduced for several years and had not completely recovered 
by 1941. 
PRODUCTION OF CORN IN SELECTED STATES. IN MILLIONS OF eUSHE'LS. 1900·1942 
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A chart of hog 'production in those states looks very similar 
to these charts of corn production, only less' extreme. . Hog· 
production in the western and southern Corn Belt states was cut 
roughly in half by the drouths, and remained at that low level 
for several years.lO . . 
This means that the stocks of corn required for stabilizing 
supplies in these states would have to be very large. They would 
have to be not 25 nor 30 percent of an average crop, as in the 
eastern Corn Belt states, nor 50 percent as they were in Nebraska 
in 1941, but several times as large as an average crop. If corn 
supplies were to have been completely stabilized at average 
production (175 million bushels) in Nebraska, for example, stocks 
as large as 700 to 800 million bushels would have been needed. 
Reserve stocks in 1933 would have been four times as large as an 
average crop. And these stocks would have had to be carried 
for a good many years - 5 or 10, at least. The cost of storage 
could easily amount to as much as the total value of an entire 
corn crop. 
Is there any other way to meet the situation in these western 
states at less cost than this? . 
During the present emergency, a ready answer is to move in 
supplies of wheat at feed prices whenever corn supplies are 
short. There is plenty of wheat on hand, and the wartime 
emergency justifies the CCC's taking a loss on it for feeding 
purposes. But in ordinary times this sort of loss should be avoided 
if possible. When drouth severely reduces the size of the corn 
crop in the western states, it usually reduces the size of the wheat 
crop, too. 
In ordinary times, one of the best ways would be to let supplies 
accumulate most heavily in Iowa, and let Nebraska draw upon 
them when she has used up her own reserves. Iowa raises three 
or four times as much corn as Nebraska, and ships out 10 or 15 
percent of it, usually east and south. South Dakota could draw 
on Minnesota for most of her ever-normal granary supplies. The 
1934 and 1936 drouths cut coni production only about 50 percent 
in Iowa and Minnesota (and less than that in eastern Corn Belt 
states) and production in those states snapped back to normal or 
higher immediately after the drouths; Substantial stocks built 
up in Minnesota, Iowa and Illinois would have been relatively 
ample for the western states to draw on, particularly since the 
eastern states were less hard hit by the drouths and did not need 
to draw on Minnesota, Iowa and Illinois as much as usual. One 
good way to handle the severe fluctuations in the western states, 
therefore, wpuld be to hold large enough ever-normal granary 
10 See fig. 19, Production of hogs in seven Com Belt states 1924·40, p. 59, 
Controlling corn and hog supplies and prices, Technical Bulletin No. 826, JUne, 
1942. United States Department of Agriculture, by the seuior author. 
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stocks in the states just east of the Missouri River to supply a 
major flart of the needs of the states just west of it, after those 
western states have used up their own reserves. It would liJe 
cheaper for the CCC to absorb the freight costs, if that were 
considered desirable, than to pay the storing costs west of the river. 
An additional factor that does not show up in the production 
figures needs to be taken into account - insect damage. East 
of the IOOth meridian, insect damage increases with distance south. 
Corn in storage in Missouri is subject to high insect damage. 
Fortunately, the price of corn in Missouri ordinarily runs from 
5 to 10 cents higher than in Iowa - enough to cover the costs 
of transportation in most cases. This indicates· that one way to 
reduce insect damage is to hold large enough supplies in Iowa 
and Illinois to provide ever-normal granary supplies for Missouri 
as well. 
One final consideration remains. Iowa, Minnesota and Illinois 
are the states with the highest percentages of surplus corn 
productioon over local needs. This means three things: First, 
corn prices are lower there than almost anywhere else; second, 
these three states have surplus corn available, and, being centrally 
located, they can ship it in any direction as needed; and, finally, 
as shown above, the states that have the largest surpluses are the 
O:Ies that seal the most corn and in many cases eventually let the 
CCC take it over. 
Apparently, large storage stocks of corn wiU continue to 
accumulate in Minnesota, Iowa and Illinois. Fortunately, tbis is 
where they are needed. They are an asset and not a liability, 
and ample storage space soould be provided for them. The stocks 
of corn on farms in Iowa on the last Oct. 1 before the United 
States declared war were 200 million bushels, a little less than 
half an Iowa crop. These stocks are not too large, as originally 
believed. They are about the right size. These three states are 
good places to keep extra supplies for the states just west and 
south, as shown above, and plans could well be made to carry 
stocks equal to half a crop, or more, in these states whenever 
crops in the future are large. 
